Electronic Weapon Attack Video Capture Analysis

Because of bandwidth I can no longer support this file.


(updated with notes 9/19/03)

One July 8, 2003, pursuant to my advice to attempt to capture evidence of attack upon my client by electronic weapons of political control technology (PCT,) a video tape was made by the client in just such an attempt. The client is a retired woman who, along with her husband, have suffered long term attacks by two technology classes of PCT identified by rather clear symptoms indicative of each. In providing consulting services to supplement my books on topic, I had advised she obtain a digital video camera for the purpose. This, she did.

I include with this document a portion of her tape, which was roughly three hours long. The most useful portion was roughly thirty minutes fairly early in the tape. From this, I have selected roughly 1 and one-half minutes of the most dramatic portion for analysis purposes. The version of this included here has been compressed using MPEG4 standards to make it small enough for email and Web use, but to retain as much quality as possible.

Permissions are hereby granted for any form of distribution or reproduction of this document and the video as a collective, provided content is not edited. Additional commentary of any pro or con nature may be added, if clearly marked as such. I have obtained the authority and approval of the client to offer these permissions. For reasons stated at this document's end, I do not reveal the name of the client.

The very first effort by the client produced dramatic and unexpected results, perhaps due, in part, to a misunderstanding which coincidentally yielded fortunate findings. The type of attack I had sought to capture on video was a sonic bullet attack, which would literally knock her to the floor, or spin her about. It was my belief that video would produce details which could prove this was external force acting upon her body.

However, the client undertook instead to attempt to capture what is believed to be a pulsed microwave energy attack by simply aiming the camera about randomly with the notion that the attack would somehow be recorded by the camera in some useful way. This was the basis of misunderstanding between us.

It may be useful to note that dialogs, especially in written format, between victims and other parties, often suffer such misunderstandings. An inability to communicate well is an intended byproduct of PCT, which is itself intended to achieve the primary goal of invalidating and isolating the victim in all social contexts, especially with authorities that might be approached for help.

In this case, the client is further handicapped by intense visual handicaps - she cannot well read anything smaller than 36 pts. computer text. This means only a few words at a time can appear on her computer, making full sentence context all the more difficult to grasp. While I had no reason to believe that invisible electronic energies could be seen on video, this was apparently what the victim thought I was intending.

First Video Effect Noted

Regardless, in the presence of witnesses, a visible phenomenon was recorded which seemed to be synchronous with the attacks, which I would describe as constantly in play, yet intermittent in form, and from multiple attack sources (angles). These are believed by the client for logical reason, to be four homes which surround the victim. The video supports this notion, as will be discussed.

The observable effect first noted by the client were shifts in color hue and formation of color streaks on the LCD (liquid crystal display) viewfinder panel used to show the user what the camera was 'seeing.' While this unexpected 'symptom' was certainly 'evidential' in nature to the victims at the time, the effect they describe verbally on the tape is hardly visible in the final tape in the same manner as it was in the LDC viewfinder at the time.

As such, it is not admissible as evidence in our discussion, and further, it is logical to assume there are alternative explanations which may account for the effect, in that it is inherent in the nature of LCD displays to display visual artifacts and aberrations which detract from image quality, when compared to the actual final recorded image. We cannot well use this effect to publicly demonstrate the attacks are real. We won't have to.

However, more study of this described effect may lead to whole new ways to test for and reveal PCT attack technologies in use. That, alone, is good news to victims, who are frequently so emotionally, mentally, and physically stymied by invisible technologies, that any means to confirm the truth to themselves and reveal it to others is most welcome. This one might be simple and easy to employ without expensive and complex solutions. All they might need, is a camera.

Second and Third Video Effects

However, something more useful and concrete was captured on tape. It is something perhaps even more useful: both audio and video disturbances which themselves offer telling clues. Astute observers and skeptics might be moved to establish alternative explanations for these effects, which are a rapid soft clicking noise much like a shutter, and a flickering of brightness which itself is suggestive of a shutter as when viewing a projected film where the individual image frames are out of synch with the projector.

Review of Possible Alternative Explanations

Any good investigative analysis or presentation of any evidence on any matter must include a rigorous attempt to evaluate for possible causes which negate the evidence. Any presentation which fails to include such an analysis leaves itself open to room for doubt in the mind of the reader, and tends to invalidate its worth. Thus, before discussing what the phenomenon may be with respect to PCT, we must determine what it is not, doing so to a useful level of reader satisfaction. Let us review the possible alternatives and then seek to deduce their likelihood.

Possible Camera Induced Effect?

In light of the aforementioned description of the effects as 'shutter like,' a logical conclusion might be a malfunctioning camera shutter, which is a mechanical element in most cameras. Actually, in digital cameras, many do not use a physical shutter, at all, but simulate them electronically. No effort has been made to determine if the camera involved has a mechanical shutter beyond review of the user manual, which does not so state.

But it is important to note that an electronic shutter makes no noise, at all. Thus, while a malfunctioning electronic shutter might produce a visual effect, it should not impart a corresponding audio effect. If we knew the shutter type was electronic, we would already be able to discount the shutter as an effect source. Unfortunately, we cannot immediately so state.

Another possible source for the effect might arguably be a defective or stuttering tape feed system. Digital cameras, like older technologies, use a cassette tape of some sort, in this case, Hi-8 format. But digital cameras also favor a digital stepper motor for precise, smooth tape feed, which allows it to insure frames are recorded in absolute synchronisity to the shutter. In essence, this is intended to prevent the precise type of effect noted by the victim. However, it is conceivable that a given defect in a tape feed system might still produce both a mechanical or physical sound and cause an aberration in visual quality of almost any unpredictable sort.

Note: It has been pointed out that I have (carelessly) misapplied the term 'digital' in connection with the term 'camera.' There is a class of cameras which can properly called 'digital cameras' which record a digital signal on digital tape and output a digital signal (such as FireWire), which are of the type I have proposed below as superior for the purpose of further attempting to duplicate this phenomenon. In this report, I am speaking of a camera which uses digital electronics for its control and key design components. The Camera used by the victim (described below) is not in the former class, but the latter. I elected to provide this note, and others added herein, rather than simply rewriting the text for clarity; people sometimes question motives behind changes without explanations. I regret any confusion this may have caused, and thank the gentleman who politely pointed out this error, and who also suggested the need for an additional clarification, also offered in note form, below.

Attendant to in camera alternatives is the notion of a raw physical or electronic fault in the camera which intermittently causes the observed effects. A loose motor, electrical connection, or other component, for instance, might cause almost any aberration visually and/or audibly. All of these must be evaluated as possibilities.

External Caused Effects?

There are two chief concerns. One source for the aberration might be common electrical interference caused by close proximity to a strong electrical source, such as AC power cords or AC motors, etc. It is known that overpowering magnetic fields and radio frequencies often cause unexpected results when using portable DC powered electronic items, such as a portable phone. A camera is also a DC powered device.

While there is clearly no such source visible in the images presented (a clear glass top table with metal legs, some plates and a cake box -- later in the video, the victim eats cake,) we have no concrete way of flatly stating no such source was intermittently near the camera. A skeptic might argue something was concealed in the cake box, or the hands of the camera operator. Thus we must still consider it possible in our analysis.

The second concern is that perhaps the camera was being physically subjected to some vibrational force which both imparted sound to the microphone and impacted on visual quality. For example, what would be the effect of touching the camera case with a portable item containing an small DC powered motor or vibrating element (i.e., pocket pager with buzzer) which operated intermittently? Vibrations might cause unexpected results.

Comparative Frequency Analysis Methodology

All of the above internal and external sources for the observed effects can be discussed at length in hopes of arriving at determination. Each was so considered, but in the end, there was discovered one primary means of evaluation which seemed to address almost all of them equally well. It is based on the notion of frequency of operation.

Most of the primary forces at work have a definable primary operational frequency. It is known that with respect to inducing aberrations in electronics, that the operating frequency of both the electronic device and the source of the aberration will interact with one another in a consistent manner. This interaction will produce an effect which is consistent with the relationship between the two frequencies involved. Frequencies are described either as cycles per second, or Hz, which essentially mean the same thing. In the case of a camera, we also talk about frames per second.

For example, if a 60 cycle AC frequency is the source of the aberration, the effect must necessarily by sympathetic to that frequency. This is to say that the effect will be observable 60 times per second, or some multiple or divisible factor, thereof. 120 times per second, for instance, is possible if the device also operates at 60 Hz and their operations happens to be synchronized with a 50% offset.

In like manner, any number representing the Hz divided by some number an even number of times could also result. In the same 60 Hz example, frequencies such as 10, 12, 15, and 30 can result if there is a relational difference in the operational frequency of the source and the device in question. For example, a device operating at 50 Hz might produce an aberration notable at 10 Hz when effected by 60 cycle power, because BOTH are divisible by the number ten. Thus, at every ten cycles, only then are both 'synchronized,' and at this point, the interference effect is dramatically amplified many orders of magnitude -- to the point of becoming an observable effect.

Determining the Frequency of the Observable Effect

The primary element to first review is the frequency of the effects noted, since the suspect causes, by and large, have defined operating frequencies. The manual states the camera shutter operates at 60 frames per second, except when in image stabilization mode, when 100 FPS is used. This feature was not in use. However, the camera records standard video at 30 frames per second, which is the speed used in common video playback technology, including television.

The doubling of shutter speed allows the camera to digitally repair select problems inherent in video technology. If a given flaw in the image is detected, the cameras can 'rob' the good part from the next, otherwise unused frame grab. Many Hi-res cameras use this method in similar manner to enhance effective camera resolution through various signal processing techniques which compare the two adjacent frame images. Cameras which do this introduce artifacts at the point of subject motion, and that effect is noted when magnifying images made from this camera.

The problem at hand, is to determine the frequency of the noted aberration in order to compare it to potential causes of the effect. I originally estimated it was in the range of 10-15Hz, which is a speed I am familiar with as one common to PCT technology. The reason this is so is because the human brain operates in these same general ranges for rendering thought and emotion. Since PCT is intended to assault and modify both, it is common for them to employ this operating range. But accuracy is called for in our efforts, here.

In an attempt to evaluate this, I transferred the digital tape content into a QuickTime movie at 30 FPS using a Macintosh equipped with a video capture capability. This allowed complete capture and perfect computer display of the observed effects EXACTLY as seen using the built-in viewfinder, as well as playback on a television. QuickTime offers a number of compression routines, but non were used, in order to retain image quality of the original for visual analysis of the effect (described subsequently.) A single 1.5 minute segment took 415 megabytes of storage, and was transferred to a CD-ROM for portability.

Next I isolated a single two-second clip of the effect in question and made it into a single movie. I used a section where there was no other discernible background noises apparent. Using single frame advances, I counted the number of times the image visually cycled between light and dark images, which seemed visually coordinated with the sound heard on the tape. I then divided by two in order to compute for a single second and allow 'conversion' to its equivalent operational frequency in Hz.

Use of two seconds and dividing would be more accurate than if just using one, and it allowed to verify what was implied visually and audibly -- that the phenomenon was completely cyclic in nature and not subject to variances in frequency; the first and the second second counts were indeed identical. By this process, two important facts were determined, along with useful secondary deductions.

One: The number was not divisible into 30 or 60, which are the operating frequencies of the camera, and of AC power. The number was 11.5 or 11, depending on if choosing to include the last frame in the count, or not. This last frame was just starting to go dark, and this leads us to the next observed phenomenon...

Two: Some of the frames were starkly dark compared to adjacent 'normal' brilliant frames both ahead and behind in the sequence. Yet others seemed to instead offer two adjacent frames which were quite dark, but not as dark as the prior example, collectively sandwiched between bright frames on either side. This tells us two things.

a) The cyclic event being captured is indeed not synchronous with the shutter operation, because it actually transcends multiple shutter operations in some cases.

b) The duration or 'length' of time that the effect is in play is itself longer in duration than 1/60 of a second, because a single frame can capture it at its darkest point. Yet it is also longer than 1/30th of a second because it can transcend two adjacent frames. That some effected frames are singular and others paired is to be expected given the lack of synchronisity between 60FPS and 11 Hz. That dual frame capture is at lower intensity implies that its start and end is at some point in time within the two frames, and thus, its duration is likely less than 1/15th of a second (two frames.) Since it does not repeatedly take two frames, the actual pulse width must be somewhere in the range of 1/20th of a second.

Based on these findings, we can rightly conclude that neither the shutter or the tape feed motor mechanism was the a cause, because it operates at 60 cps, which is not divisible by 11. The fact that the effect transcends single frames is also proof the shutter was not involved. We can also eliminate AC power for the same reason; 60 CPS is not divisible by 11.

Evaluating Remaining Alternatives

We still might argue that tape feed may still be a factor, considering a defect in the cartridge might cause uneven stress or tension on the tape. If the tape were damaged and rubbing, for instance, it could also introduce a sound pattern discernible by the microphone. However, these kinds of problems produce signal recording irregularities on the tape whereby the signal is recorded in too-little or too-much space; the digital data is stretched out or compressed.

Note: This is true of analog signals as well.

Playback of recordings damaged in this way produce a wide variety of visual and audible effects based on garbled signal data. This commonly results in physically distorted images and sounds with streaks or snow, and audio 'noise.' None of these effects are not exhibited here, and moreover, the sound of a bad tape feed process would itself be garbled on the tape -- making it impossible to have a steady clicking sound. That, too, is not the case, here. Errant tape feed or defective tape cartridges are thus not a factor.

Camera reliability was therefore carefully considered, and was actually the foremost likely candidate early in the process. The camera used was a relatively inexpensive Hi-8 SharpVL-AH60 model with digital zoom (a feature which was not used in the effort.) The camera was made available to me for full inspection and after a rigorous attempt to duplicate the phenomenon without success, I can report finding no fault with the camera, nor any inherent ability to manipulate recorded content to duplicate the results. Other users subsequently concur. It appears to be a phenomenon unique to the recording taken at the time, not duplicated subsequently by any contrived means, including improper user operation.

The notion of an external cause is more problematic. Could some devices such as a pager or cellphone have made physical contact with the camera on an intermittent basis? The victim will tell you flatly, this was not the case. Again, review of the video offers no evidence of such cause, and much evidence it was not so. Only if the device were strapped directly to the camera, or in the hand of the user, could this be a factor. The camera is relocated and re-aimed repeatedly, by hand.

The only other possibility which remains is externally induced RF interference. Conventional RF ambient energies generally do not impact on cameras. In fact, I know of no such interference or symptom of this sort ever being reported by anyone, at any time, and I have worked in the video industry as user, installer, and marketer. I repeatedly work with others of like circumstance.

In point of fact, there are very few devices which operate in low frequency ranges in the first place. The nature of RF is that more data and thus, higher quality of data, can be imbedded in higher frequencies than in lower. However, there is one category of electronic device which prominently works in such ranges.

That category is PCT weapon technology. I submit that pulsed microwave energy is exactly this type of RF signal. Further, after discussing this matter with various persons more knowledgeable than I, it is confirmed by all involved that microwave energy at intense levels can have an effect on digital devices to specifically include digital camera elements (the part that 'sees.')

Additional Evidence

There are additional clues to be found in review of the tape images more carefully. For one, as supposed by the client, the camera seems only to suffer the aberration when directly aimed at the attack source. My sources tell me this also supports the notion of microwave interference. The wave length of a microwave is rather long, which is one reason the camera 'sees' it. It is approximately as 'long' as the reflexive abilities of the camera elements involved.

But if oblique to the camera, the wave length is compressed compared to the perpendicular, and the camera has trouble seeing it, or may not see it, at all. Further, the energy levels imparted by (in this presumed case) pulsed microwaves may themselves impact on the camera components. Thus if the energy is perpendicularly attacking the camera's image receptors, it is much more likely to impact their performance, than if at an angle. At an angle, there is some opportunity for diffraction, reflection, and increased absorption through a larger physical area of materials, especially those materials called 'substrates' and the protective 'chip' materials that we physically see when looking at electronics.

A secondary phenomenon was also observed at one point in the video, which may serve to reinforce the above. The camera was removed from an 'attack' angle to another, and for a brief second or two, there was a notable change in the frequency of the observed effect, a slowing down, as it were.

Ever so slight, one might miss it unless watching specifically for it. This is reminiscent of a doppler effect, a change in pitch and tempo associated with the moving of either the source or the receptor along a path towards or away from the source. With a low frequency wave of long duration, such as microwaves, a doppler effect might be discernible in such a case.

The problem I have with this observance is that the camera was not only moved away, but angled away. In that (at the table) sequence, there are three distinct angles which produce the observed effect, only one of which is subdued in a doppler manner. However, this may be due to the multiple attack angles (four houses) involved. Further, though there is an audible 'doppler' effect (pointing at empty chair) the visual effect almost entirely vanishes. It does remain sufficient to count, and it still remains constant at 11 Hz. Thus only the sound seems to suffer 'doppler,' where the video aberration is simply fainter.

Note: To restate at the request of reader commentary suggesting more clarity is in order: the 'doppler effect' is the DESCRIPTION of the experienced phenomenon. It is not a true doppler effect, it only has the same kinds of experiential 'symptoms.' As pointed out in the reader's commentary, doppler effects for a 'speed of light' energy would require near speed-of-light movement of (in this case, the camera) to effect. This would clearly not be possible. But something SIMILAR to a doppler effect IS experienced in this instance. As an observable phenomenon, I needed to report its existence, as it may be a helpful clue to some better understanding in the future.

This brings us to the other observable clue. The image quality during the observable effect suffers dramatically. It is as if the camera is no longer able to successfully take advantage of its hi-resolution capabilities. The image is reduced to what appears to be a series of large low res squares. This effect is not an actual reduction in resolution, per se. It is reducing the quantity of information used to represent the square in terms of color depth and detail.

It implies that something is impacting on the camera's image quality in a way that the signal processing cannot figure out how to compensate in a useful way. The result is a kind of rectangular blotchiness. The camera's manual troubleshooting section only discusses 'video noise in image,' which is reasonably similar to the above description. Their only suggested cause is dirty tape heads or worn tape. The tape is new, and use of the camera and the tape subsequently do not duplicate the phenomenon.


The tape clearly captures an otherwise unexplainable phenomenon. This phenomenon can be safely described by virtue of what it is not. It is not a malfunction or induced by normal interference. What remains is less satisfying, but highly encouraging, for it is entirely sympathetic to what little is known about PCT technology. Thus it can be said that the tape depicts something out of the norm, something which defies explanation except perhaps in the context of PCT.

This is not nearly as good as we would like. It does not constitute proof of an attack suitable for all uses. To the extent that we have eliminated all likely alternative causes, we can claim a high likelihood of PCT as the cause. As such, it makes an excellent promotional and educational tool for the cause of eliciting support from the general public, but it probably falls short of scientific or legal requirements needed to recruit the involvement of professionals or initiating legal actions.

Since we are dealing with an unknown, covertly developed and deployed technology, that should be expected. The whole theory of PCT as a weapon is based the ability to employ covert application against victims who are powerless to easily defend against it. We might be tempted to add, easily detect it, but as we see, that may no longer be the case.


The entire matter is very encouraging, while at the same time, problematic. What is needed is an independent test undertaken by someone other than the victim, ideally in controlled circumstances, with witnesses, and documentary procedures. What would such a test look like?

Ideally, there would be multiple cameras to test to see if all digital cameras were capable of 'seeing' the effects noted. The ideal camera type for analytical purposes would have a FireWire connector, because that will plug directly into FireWire equipped computers for video capture without the need of expensive add-on components. Macintosh includes FireWire on almost all models, such as those found in schools and libraries, and are also equipped with useful editing software for the purpose.

Cameras would be mounted on a board such that they could collectively be simultaneously re aimed as a collective. In the foreground I would like to see (mounted in fixed viewing position) a TriField meter or similar RF detection device. The ideal situation would be to use a heavy commercial grade tripod (a lot of weight with several cameras) to allow hand's free operation, save re-aiming, which would be relatively hands free using tripod pan and tilt handles.

A separate camera would be used to video the tests, themselves, to provide a journal of steps taken and observations, problems, solutions, etc. A written version would be produced, from that. The goal is to duplicate the victim effects in a way which eliminates all variables which might represent potential professional and legal roadblocks to acceptance. The effort would also result in a more scientific sample for further analysis such as attempted, here.

By having a controlled test as described, resulting tapes could be given over to laboratories and other experts for review with an expectation that their findings are not cluttered with hypothetic or conditional questions based on unknowns and undefined variables. They will be free to focus on that which we wish without compromise by flawed methodology.

The team that undertakes such a test would ideally include one video professional, one TSCM (Technical Security Countermeasures) or PCT knowledgeable person, one person to video document, and one eyewitness, as well as any victim(s) under attack.

The project suffers one very serious problem. Such attacks include monitoring of the victim with constant surveillance. Those responsible for the attacks need only detect such a team or study and shut down temporarily, to deter it from having any usefulness, whatsoever.

Thus the entire project as described is inherently unworkable in the real world. It is part of the reason that victims are unable to enlist needed helps from professionals; they cannot illustrate the problem, because when the professional arrives, the attacks are abated.

Thus what is needed is a more covert operation. Since the attacks are highly directional and presumed to originate from known houses, it might be possible to intercept the microwave beams at a point between the source and target. Perhaps a pedestrian or mobile unit (car/van) might be able to do this without detection. It is presumed the attackers do not both man the windows and surveillance systems while operating attack equipment -- they might be watching the victim, but they are probably not watching the street and the neighborhood.

Two persons per attack source might be required, for a team of eight in this case, plus perhaps a ninth person inside the target's home. Walkie talkies or other means of communications would be needed, but words should not be employed. A signal system to indicate which house was involved in an attack at a given moment would be needed. This would need to be fed into the audio tracks of the cameras, as well.

Only by synchronizing victim complaints of an attack with signal capture (effect capture) can any legal proof be established suitable for taking legal actions. Complaints to police would be expected to be ignored, unless video evidence was compelling. Lawsuits might also be attempted. But there is also the provision under the law to exercise self defense.

These attacks are seen as life threatening. Thus it is reasonable to assume, under the law, that one has a right to take extreme measures to defend one's self. If one were to follow such a logic path, the best execution would be a 'raid' of the attacker's home to capture and document equipment used, and subdue the attacker, all on video.

I, alone, am unable to put together the needed resources for such scenarios, and would find it difficult to devote the time and money it represents (travel expenses, rental of cameras, vehicles, etc.) I do have access to computer resources, knowledge of PCT/TSCM, and for the matter, video. I would need volunteers. Clearly, there would need to be discussion, planning, and covert stealth in final deployment.

Pending any final outcome of such discussion, I have taken care to deliberately avoid mentioning who the victim is, or where they are located. It would be wise not to give the attackers an advance warning as to tactics which might be employed against them. There are undoubtedly many victims experiencing similar attacks. Let all attackers be put on notice. We might bust in your door at any moment in self defense. I dare say, some of us might even hope you put up resistance. I know at least three ex-marines types trained in Search and Destroy operations who so feel.

H. Michael Sweeney, author
The Professional Paranoid: How to Fight Back When Investigated, Stalked or Harassed by Any Agency, Group, or Individual, and,
MC Realities: Understanding, Detection, and Defeating Mind Control and Electronic Weapons of Political Control Technology

For a free sample newsletter featuring Political Control Technology, send an email to: hms@proparanoid.com

Received 9-14-2003